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ABSTRACT
Fixed pricing for healthcare services is emerging as an attractive business model for private
healthcare service providers. Under fixed pricing (or flat rate) contract, the patient is charged
a fixed price for the healthcare services irrespective of the actual cost incurred by the hos-
pital. Such contracts increase the risks for the healthcare service provider, thus making pric-
ing decision crucial. In this paper, we study uncertainty and analyse the flat rate pricing
contract for a profit maximising hospital to find the optimal price of treatment and exam-
ined value-at-risk (VaR) associated with such contracts for a risk minimising hospital. Bounds
on price were derived to support healthcare providers with price negotiations. We extended
the basic models by adding constraints to obtain risk-adjusted optimal price. We proved
analytically that the optimal price lies between profit maximisation value and risk minimisa-
tion value of price, which we refer to as the efficient pricing interval. Our models and
insights provide practical support to private healthcare service providers for optimal pricing
and keep them informed about their risk position.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, fixed price strategy is being followed
widely in which the healthcare service providers are
paid a fixed price for the complete treatment rather
than for each service that a patient receives. Taking
the example of cardiac surgery, a fixed-price solution
may include costs towards stay in general ward prior
to surgery and subsequent stay in specialised wards
such as the intensive cardiac care unit (ICCU) and
the high dependency unit (HDU), costs towards
operation theatre time, costs for the surgeons and
anaesthetists, cost of medication and follow-up
appointment with consultants, costs for nursing, and
so on. A fixed price strategy, such as the one
described above, is increasingly being adopted by
both publicly funded healthcare systems, for e.g., the
UK NHS, which also treats private patients, and
those that are dominated by the private healthcare
insurance sector, as in India and the US. To highlight
the practical relevance of our work, we begin by dis-
cussing the importance of fixed-price strategy for
both private and public healthcare systems.
In a private healthcare system, the intended users of
the systems (the patients) usually purchase their health
insurance. A certain percentage of the population,
however, remain uninsured affecting their ability to
access routine health care and having to pay out-of-
pocket at the point of delivery (note, treatment in acci-
dent and emergency is usually free). The National
Center for Health Statistics in the US analysed data
from the 2015 National Health Interview Survey
(NHIS) and reported that the number of persons under
the age of 65 years that were uninsured at the time of
the survey was 28.4 million; this accounted for 10.5%
of persons under the age of 65 years (Ward, Clarke,
Nugent, & Schiller, 2016). In the case of India, which
spends around 5% of the GDP on health care, nearly
70% of health spending is borne by households, out-of-
pocket sources (Garg & Karan, 2009). With fixed price
services being offered for healthcare services, patients
“shop” as consumers by comparing prices of various
hospitals as providers (Richman, Udayakumar,
Mitchell, & Schulman, 2008).
For publicly funded healthcare services, demand for
treatment usually exceeds the available capacity, and
patients with non-urgent treatment requirements (e.g.,
those requiring elective procedures) are put into wait-
ing list unless they are willing to pay for private care
(Gutacker, Siciliani, & Cookson, 2016). The distinction
here with co-payment models of health care is that a
contribution towards the costs of care is sought from
the patients (Sonnessa, Tanfani, & Testi, 2017).
According to monitor, the sector regulator for health
services in England, income generated by the NHS
CONTACT Navonil Mustafee n.mustafee@exeter.ac.uk The Centre for Simulation, Analytics and Modelling (CSAM), Department of Science,
Innovation, Technology, and Entrepreneurship (SITE), University of Exeter Business School, Exeter, EX4 4PU UK
 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not
altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
JOURNAL OF THE OPERATIONAL RESEARCH SOCIETY
https://doi.org/10.1080/01605682.2019.1654416
from treating private patients (private patient income
or PPI) has steadily increased from £98.4 million in
2005/06 to £389.4 million in 2013/14 (Monitor, 2014).
With the 2012 Health and Social Care Act (HSCA),
hospitals have been allowed to raise up to 49% of
income from non-NHS work, which translates to more
private patients. For these patients, although they are
being treated in a publicly funded facility, greater trans-
parency in healthcare pricing will enable them to make
informed decisions as to the hospital they would
choose for their treatment. Galetsi and Katsaliaki
(2019) reported use of big data analytics in healthcare,
and one of the main objectives is to reduce the cost of
treatment and identification of high risk/cost patients.
In this paper, we analyse fixed pricing in health-
care services to find the optimal pricing under dif-
ferent scenarios. We have contributed to the
healthcare service literature by analysing flat rate
pricing under cost uncertainty which has not been
studied in the literature to the best of our know-
ledge. We have also developed a risk-based pricing
model for a healthcare provider using value-at-risk
(VaR) analysis which helps hospital management to
incorporate risk into their pricing decisions. Our
optimisation models provide practical support while
negotiating the price with the consumer. We believe
that this work helps healthcare providers make an
informed decision on pricing their services.
2. Pricing models and their relevance in
pricing healthcare services
The basic pricing model used in the pricing of prod-
ucts is linear pricing, where the price is a linear
function of the quantity purchased. The second kind
of pricing strategy is called non-linear pricing,
where the quantity purchased affects the price. The
simplest example of non-linear pricing is the two-
part pricing consisting of flat price and usage-based
pricing when the usage exceeds a specified thresh-
old. In the context of health care, the usage rate of
healthcare service is not a function of price; rather,
it depends on the individual consumer’s health con-
dition. Also, the quantity of the service consumed
does not affect patients’ valuation of the service as
they are unaware of their consumption. In fact, the
whole set of services is like one product, for
example, heart surgery, wherein the patient does not
have a choice of opting out from some treatment
procedures which are an integral part of the surgery
per se, neither can the hospital refuse to provide
those services in order to save/optimise on cost.
Therefore, we argue that non-linear pricing, such as
two-part tariff, is not appropriate in health-
care services.
In recent years, fixed price strategy is being fol-
lowed widely in the industry wherein the providers
are paid a fixed price for services such as internet
access (Odlyzko, 1999), information goods
(Sundararajan, 2004) and telephone services
(Mitchell, 1978). Research has focused on finding
different conditions under which one should choose
a flat rate, usage-based and two-part tariff (fixed fee
along with per usage charges) as the pricing strat-
egy. The existence of a flat rate pricing strategy has
been attributed to flat-rate bias (Train, 1991).
Empirical literature documenting the flat-rate bias
points out that this bias is driven by consumers’
uncertainty about future consumption (Herweg &
Mierendorff, 2013). This fits perfectly in a health-
care setting where the patient or the consumer is
uncertain of his future consumption of care required
from the healthcare service providers.
The fixed price model in health care has mitigated
the risk of cost uncertainty for the consumers and
turned the risk tables on the healthcare service pro-
vider instead (Richman et al., 2008). The hospitals are
therefore under huge financial risk since the entire
monetary risk (which may occur due to failed internal
processes, people and systems, or from external
events) is transferred to them. Previously, in usage-
based pricing, the hospital would receive payment for
each of the services provided, wherein they earned a
fixed profit. However, with a fixed package pricing,
their revenue is fixed with the uncertain cost of treat-
ment, so the profit is no more certain. However, along
with this risk, there are benefits too: i.e., on the one
hand, the hospital may make a loss when treating a
high severity patient, but on the other hand, it may
make a larger profit with a patient with less severity.
The tradeoff between the two is what needs to be bal-
anced. Therefore, it is important for a healthcare pro-
vider to study its costs and make better pricing
decisions in the presence of uncertainty.
In this paper, we analysed the pricing problem
faced by a monopolist hospital analytically and
derive optimal price under flat-rate pricing strat-
egy. To our best knowledge, the literature on opti-
mal pricing is scarce in the healthcare industry.
Newhouse (1970) and Margolis (1983) solved the
profit maximisation problem to find optimal pric-
ing of physician services. Pricing model by
Dittman and Morey (1981) sets prices which
maximise the hospital’s profit while curtailing
total hospital resources. These papers assumed
that costs are known to the hospital. Our pricing
model extends these models to find the optimal
price under cost uncertainty. We use VaR analysis
to incorporate risk due to uncertainty to make
risk-adjusted pricing decisions.
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3. Flat rate pricing model – theory
development
We make two assumptions for the flat rate pricing
model: (a) “Demand” is a function of price, and (b)
Hospital does not change the quality of care depend-
ing on the severity of the patient. We offer justifica-
tion in support of our two assumptions as follows. In
relation to (a), Ringer and Hosek (2000) have stated
that demand, in general, is price and income inelastic,
but certain types of care are more sensitive to price
such as preventive care and pharmacy. This is mainly
due to multiple substitutes present in these cases.
Therefore, it is arguable that the assumption “demand
is price elastic” can hold for countries where there is a
lack of insurance and dominance of multiple private
healthcare providers. Concerning (b), Richman et al.
(2008) have stated that Indian hospitals, for example,
have managed to give quality treatment within this
constraint of a flat fee.
We define the total cost (TC) function as follows:
TC ¼ b0Xb1 , 0<b1< 1 (1)
The function in Equation (1) is similar to
Cobb–Douglas production function in economics
literature which is widely used to represent the rela-
tionship between inputs and output produced. In
our case, the output is the TC incurred, and the
input is the length of stay (X) of the patient. Length
of stay (LoS) is considered as a reasonable proxy of
resource consumption (Marazzi, Paccaud, Ruffieux,
& Beguin, 1998), and in our model, we introduce
uncertainty in the cost of treatment by assuming the
cost to be a function of LoS. Ayer, Ayvaci, Karaca,
and Vlachy (2019) claimed that there is a significant
difference in LoS distribution across cohorts. There
is empirical evidence that the treatment cost is a
concave function of LoS (Polverejan, Gardiner,
Bradley, Holmes Rovner, & Rovner, 2003). This is
also rather intuitive since a major part of the total
cost (high utilisation of resources) is incurred dur-
ing the initial period of stay in the hospital. This
function has decreasing returns to scale since
0<b1< 1. We know that the LoS of a patient is
random due to the difference in the severity of indi-
vidual patients and in most cases an unknown
quantity. Kumar, Costa, Fackrell, and Taylor (2018)
claim that the range of LoS is large and generally
positively skewed.
In literature, both log-normal and phase type dis-
tributions are used for modelling the LoS. Marazzi
et al. (1998) compared lognormal, Weibull, and
gamma distributions for LOS distributions for mul-
tiple countries. They suggested both log-normal and
Weibull distributions depending on country and
diagnosis/illness. Exponential and phase type distri-
butions have been used for fitting LoS for geriatric/
elderly patients (Marshall, McClean, Shapcott, &
Millard, 2002; Marshall & McClean, 2003, 2004;
Vasilakis & Marshall, 2005). Faddy, Graves, and
Pettitt (2009) compared phase type, gamma and log-
normal distributions for LoS distribution. Though
they show that phase type is a better fit in compari-
son but log-normal too gave a good fit (BIC ¼
9927.85 and 9936.21, respectively). Also, they
found similar estimates of the covariates for both
the distributions. Demir, Lebcir, and Adeyemi
(2014) modelled length of stay using continuous
time Markov chain in the context of neonatal care.
Gillespie et al. (2016) used a phase type distribution
(Markov chain) to model the entire patient journey
for a specific treatment.
In this paper, we use both log-normal and phase-
type distribution (Erlang) to study the problem. In
the first model, we assume X as a random variable
denoting LoS, which follows a log-normal distribu-
tion with parameters l and r. The parameter r is
the shape parameter of X, while el is the scale par-
ameter of X, where X1. It has been widely known
that distribution of LoS is rightly skewed (Atienza,
2005; Atienza, Garcıa-Heras, Mu~noz-Pichardo, &
Villa, 2008; Hellervik & Rodgers, 2007; Lim &
Tongkumchum, 2009) and empirical evidence for
log-normal distribution for LoS in a hospital is pro-
vided by Marazzi et al. (1998). In the second model,
we assume that the LoS follows an Erlang-K distri-
bution with scale parameter k and shape param-
eter h.
Notations
4. Optimal pricing and net profit for profit
maximising (risk neutral) hospital
To model the market for a healthcare service, we
assume that the customers/patients make the deci-
sions based on the price of the service. We assume
the aggregate inverse demand function, DðPÞ to be a
linear function of price.
DðPÞ ¼ abP (2)
DðPÞ is the number of customers buying the ser-
vice at price P, given the total market size of the
service is a. So, the pricing interval is [0, ab].
a: Market size for the service
offered
NPðPÞ: Hospitals net profit
b: Price sensitivity of demand a: Probability of not exceeding
a threshold profit
DðPÞ: Demand at price P E[NP(P)]: Expected net profit
b0: Accounts for factors other
than LoS
VaRa : Value at risk with probability a
b1: Cost elasticity of LoS P
 : Optimal price for profit
maximising hospital
X: Random variable denoting
length of stay
PVaR: Optimal price for risk
minimising hospital
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The net profit at price P is given by:
NPðPÞ ¼ ðPb0xb1ÞðabPÞ
 
(3)
The primary objective of the hospital is to offer a
price which maximises its expected returns.
Theorem 1a gives the optimal price, which maxi-
mises the expected profit, under the assumption that
LoS follows a log-normal distribution. Theorem 1b
gives the optimal price, which maximises the
expected profit under the assumption that the LoS
follows an Erlang-K distribution.
Theorem 1a: The optimal price for the hospital is
given by P ¼ aþ b0e
b1lþ
b1
2r2
2
 
b
2b , which maximises the
expected return for the hospital and the maximum
profit is p ¼ ab0be
b1lþ
b1
2r2
2
 2
4b , where a and b are
such that ab > b0e
b1lþb1
2r2
2 (i.e. the maximum price is
more than the expected cost).
Proof: The expected net profit is given by
E NPðPÞ½  ¼ E ðPb0xb1ÞðabPÞ
 
¼ P  b0eb1lþ
b1
2r2
2
 
ðabPÞ
(4)
From the equation, we solve the following first-
order condition to get the critical point:
@E NPðPÞ½ 
@P
¼ a2bP þ b0eb1lþ
b1
2r2
2
 
b ¼ 0
() P ¼ aþ b0e
b1lþb1
2r2
2
 
b
2b
(5)
As the second derivative @E
2½NPðPÞ
@P2 ¼ 2b is nega-
tive, P defined in (5) attains the maximum value of
the expected profit. Substituting the optimal price in
Equation (4), we get expected total profit as
abb0eb1lþ
b1
2r2
2
 2
4b , which can also be written
as 1b ðabPÞ2.
From Equation (5), we can conclude that the
optimal price decreases with price sensitivity of
demand and increases with scaling power of LoS,
mean and variance.
Theorem 1b: The optimal price for the hospital is
given by P ¼
aþ Cðkþb1Þb0hb1ðk1Þ!
 
b
2b , which maximises the
expected return for the hospital, where a and b are
such that ab >
Cðkþb1Þb0hb1
ðk1Þ!
 
(i.e., the maximum price
is more than the expected cost).
Proof: We assume X as a random variable denoting
LoS, which follows Erlang-K distribution with
parameters k and h. The parameter k is the shape
parameter of X, while h is the scale parameter of X.
The expected net profit is given by
E NPðPÞ½  ¼ E ðPb0xb1ÞðabPÞ
 
¼ ðPb0E xb1½ ÞðabPÞ
(6)
E xb1½  ¼
ð1
0
xb1 f ðxÞ where f ðxÞ ¼ x
k1e
x
h
ðk 1Þ!hk ,
¼
ð1
0
xkþb11e
x
h
ðk 1Þ!hk
Using Gamma function, we get
¼ Cðkþ b1Þh
b1
ðk 1Þ!
From the equation, we solve the following first-
order condition to get the critical point:
E NPðPÞ½  ¼ P  Cðkþ b1Þb0h
b1
ðk 1Þ!
 !
ðabPÞ
@E NPðPÞ½ 
@P
¼ a2bP þ Cðkþ b1Þb0h
b1
ðk 1Þ!
 !
b ¼ 0
() P ¼
aþ Cðkþb1Þb0hb1ðk1Þ!
 
b
2b
(7)
4.1. Feasibility of offering a flat rate price
To establish if offering the treatment at a price P is
feasible for the hospital, the hospital needs to evalu-
ate the risk of offering the treatment at the price.
We define it as the probability of profit exceeding a
threshold, which gives the risk that the hospital will
take when offering a flat rate price P for a given
treatment. Theorem 2 gives the possibility of offer-
ing the treatment at price P.
Theorem 2: The probability of the hospital’s profit
exceeding a threshold value p for demand DðPÞ is
given as:
Probp ¼ U
log 1b0 P 
p
ðabPÞ
 h i
b1l
b1r
0
@
1
A
:
Proof: Substituting the value of NPðPÞ from (3), we
have:
Prob NPðxÞ  p  ¼ Prob ðPb0xb1ÞðabPÞ  p 
() Prob b0xb1  P
p
ða bPÞ
 	
() Prob xb1  1
b0
P  pða bPÞ

 ( )
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() Prob b1 log x  log 1b0 ðP  pðabPÞÞ
h in o
, here
b1 log x follows Nðb1l, b12r2Þ
() Prob Z  ð log
1
b0
ðP pðabPÞÞ½ b1lÞ
b1r
 	
, here Z is a
standard normal variable.
() U
log 1b0 P 
p
ðabPÞ
 h i
b1l
b1r
0
@
1
A
() U
log P  pðabPÞ
 h i
ðb1lþ log b0Þ
b1r
0
@
1
A
(8)
Equation (8) gives the probability that the profit
will exceed the threshold value p. The hospital would
prefer to have the probability of exceeding its thresh-
old profit as high as possible. Corollary 2(a) gives the
price at which the probability obtained in Theorem 2
is maximised. This is the price a hospital with the
objective of earning a threshold profit should quote.
Corollary 2 (a): Given a threshold profit p, the upper
bound on price negotiation is given by Pp ¼ ab
ffiffi
p
b
p
,
where p< a
2
b
Proof: Given a threshold profit, the hospital would
like to maximise the probability of exceeding it, i.e.,
Max
P
U
log 1b0 P 
p
ðabPÞ
 h i
b1l
b1r
0
@
1
A
:
The above problem is equivalent to
MaxP 1b0 ðP  pðabPÞÞ
h i
since log and cumulative dis-
tribution functions are increasing functions. We
solve the following first-order condition to get the
critical point:
1
b0
1 pbðabPÞ2
 !
¼ 0
() Pp ¼ ab
ffiffiffi
p
b
r
(9)
As the second derivative at Pp ¼ ab
ffiffi
p
b
p
given by 
ffiffi
b
p
q
 
is negative, Pp attains a
maxima and the maximum probability is given
by U
log ab2
ffi
p
b
p  
ðb1lþ logb0Þ
b1r

 
.
From Corollary 2(a), we observe that there is a
tradeoff between the threshold profit and maximum
probability of achieving it. Corollary 2(b) shows this
tradeoff by varying the threshold around the max-
imum expected profit.
Corollary 2(b): For threshold p ¼ p ¼ 1b ðabPÞ2
(expected profit), optimal price P achieves the max-
imum probability of exceeding it given by U b1r2
 
.
Proof: Substituting the value of threshold p ¼
1
b ðabPÞ2 in Equation (7), we get Pp ¼ ab
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1
bðabPÞ2
b
q
¼ P ¼ aþ b0e
b1lþ
b1
2r2
2
 
b
2b , and the maximum probabil-
ity of exceeding the expected profit is obtained by sub-
stituting P in Equation (6) and is given by U b1r2
 
.
In this corollary, we establish that the hospital would
earn the expected profit, which is not enough as it
will happen with a certain probability. As both, Pp
and the probability of exceeding threshold have an
inverse relationship with the threshold, we can con-
clude that for p<p, we have Pp>P and the prob-
ability of exceeding threshold is greater than U b1r2
 
.
Also, for p>p, we have Pp< P and the probability
of exceeding threshold is smaller than U b1r2
 
. Using
this information on the tradeoff of threshold and
chances of exceeding it, the hospital can set its thresh-
old around the maximum expected profit. The prob-
ability of exceeding the threshold profit decreases with
the price sensitivity of demand, the variance of LoS
and scaling factor of LoS.
We propose that the hospital should offer the
treatment if it makes a positive profit with the
desired confidence level. Corollary 2(c) gives the
minimum price at which a hospital should offer
the treatment.
Corollary 2(c): Lower bound on price
The hospital should offer the treatment at price P, if
their threshold profit with confidence level 1a is posi-
tive, i.e. if ðPb0eb1lþb1rU
1ð1aÞÞðabPÞ is positive.
Proof: The hospital would like to restrict the risk
with probability a, which can be written as:
Prob ðPb0xb1ÞðabPÞ  pa
 
¼ 1a
() U log
1
b0
ðP paðabPÞÞ½ b1l
b1r
 	
¼ 1a (from Equation
(6))
() log 1
b0
P  paða bPÞ

 " #
¼ b1lþ b1rU1ð1aÞ
() P paða bPÞ ¼ b0e
b1lþb1rU1ð1aÞ
() PðabPÞpa ¼ ðabPÞb0eb1lþb1rU
1ð1aÞ
() Pb0eb1lþb1rU
1ð1aÞ
h i
ðabPÞ ¼ pa (10)
For earning positive profit ðpa> 0Þ with confi-
dence 1a, the lower bound on P is given by
b0e
b1lþb1rU1ð1aÞ, where a and b are such
that ab > b0e
b1lþb1rU1ð1aÞ.
A healthcare provider with a target profit can use
the results from Theorem 2 to analyse the
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probability of not making it to their target at a
given price. This result can be used to compare dif-
ferent prices and threshold. However, with different
thresholds comes along the different probabilities of
achieving it and profit is meaningless without the
probability of achieving it. So, to make an optimal
decision, the hospital would require a better criter-
ion to be optimised. So, we suggest that the hospital
fix the probability of making losses and minimise
their value-at-risk (VaRa) to find the optimal price.
Let us introduce VaR with a formal definition.
4.2. Optimal pricing and net profit for a risk
minimising hospital
In this section, we model the problem where the
hospital would like to minimise its risk, and where
the risk is characterised as the VaR. In the late
1980s, VaR was used by financial firms to measure
their assets portfolio risk. VaR methods have now
become a common benchmark for risk management
in the financial industry. It is a statistical technique
used to quantify potential losses/risk. Risk in the
model is characterised by the volatility of the costs
or revenue. Jorion (2007) defines VaR as the worst
loss that will not be exceeded with a given confi-
dence level, based on the estimated distribution of
returns. Mathematically, it can be written as
ProbðProfit=Loss<VaRaÞ ¼ a (see Figure 1). So,
for a confidence level a of 99% means, on average,
there is a 99% chance of the expected loss being
lower than VaR. Easy interpretation of the risk pos-
ition makes VaR a useful risk measure. It keeps
managers informed about risk so that they can
evaluate and control risk exposure. It is generally
calculated for a fixed period of time.
In this context, the hospital would like to
minimise the losses with confidence a, i.e.,
ProbðProfit=Loss<VaRaÞ ¼ a. This probability is
equivalent to ProbðProfit  VaRaÞ ¼ 1a. So,
from Corollary 2(c), the VaRa is given by:
 Pb0eb1lþb1rU
1ð1aÞ
h i
ðabPÞ (11)
Theorem 3: The optimal price PVaR ¼
aþðb0eb1lþb1rU1ð1aÞÞb
2b minimises the VaRa(VaR with con-
fidence a) for the hospital and the minimum is given
by ððabb0eb1lþb1rU
1ð1aÞÞ2
4b Þ where a and b are such
that ab > b0e
b1lþb1rU1ð1aÞ.
Proof: Rewriting the minimisation problem as a
maximisation problem, we have:
Max
P
VaRaf g
() Max
P
Pb0eb1lþb1rU
1ð1aÞ
h i
ðabPÞ
n o
From the equation, we solve the following first-
order condition to get the critical point:
@ðVaRaðPÞÞ
@P
¼ a2bP þ ðb0eb1lþb1rU
1ð1aÞÞb ¼ 0
() aþ ðb0e
b1lþb1rU1ð1aÞÞb
2b
¼ PVaR (12)
As the second derivative @
2ðVaRaðPÞÞ
@P2 ¼ 2b is
negative, PVaR attains the maximum value of
VaRaðPÞ. Substituting the optimal price in
Equation (9), we get as VaRa ¼ ðabb0e
b1lþb1rU1ð1aÞÞ2
4b ,
which can also be written as 1b ðabPVaRÞ2.
4.3. Comparing risk minimising and profit
maximising price
Theorem 4 compares the two objectives discussed in
Theorems 1 and 3. We use the concept of efficient
frontier in portfolio analysis. The efficient frontier
in portfolio analysis represents the set of portfolios
that offers a maximum return for a given level of
risk or lowest level of risk for a given level of
expected return. Portfolios not on the frontier are
sub-optimal as they have low returns for the level of
risk or they have a higher risk for a fixed return. In
Figure 2, points A, B and C are on the efficient
frontier, whereas points D and E are not optimal.
Figure 1. Value-at-risk.
Figure 2. Efficient frontier.
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We use the above concept to define a pricing
interval we call as efficient pricing interval. It gives
the hospital a price range where the expected profit
(return) and –VaR (risk) tradeoff occurs. All price
levels are dominated by the prices in this interval, i.e.,
we can always be better off with respect to both objec-
tives from choosing some point within the efficient
price interval. At any value outside this interval, we
can always find another price which gives higher
returns at a lower risk. VaR is the maximum potential
loss. So, for easy comparisons with expected profit, we
use –VaR. So, we assume a firm will prefer the least
value of VaR or highest value of –VaR.
Theorem 4: The efficient pricing interval is given
by ½PPVaR.
Proof: From Equations (4) and (9), we note
that the objectives of the two optimisation
problems are MaxP Pb0eb1lþ
b1
2r2
2
 
ðabPÞ and
MaxP ðPb0eb1lþb1rU
1ð1aÞÞðabPÞ
n o
for the profit
maximising and risk minimising problems, respect-
ively. We can derive two conclusions by comparing
these two objectives. Firstly, ENPðPÞ>VaRðPÞ for
all values of P, and secondly, PVaR>P(as average
cost is less than the worst case cost, i.e.,
b0e
b1lþb1
2r2
2 < b0e
b1lþb1rU1ð1aÞ). Let us divide the
entire pricing interval ½0, ab into three intervals [0, P],
½P,PVaR and ½PVaR, ab. We know that ENPðPÞ is
increasing on interval [0, P] and decreasing on inter-
val ½P, ab (P being the unique maxima of the con-
cave expected net profit function). Also, VaRðPÞ is
increasing on interval [0, PVaR] and decreasing on
interval ½PVaR, ab (PVaR being the unique maxima of
the concaveVaR function). We can conclude from
above observations that in the interval [0, P] and
½PVaR, ab, both ENPðPÞ and VaRðPÞ functions are
increasing and decreasing functions, respectively. As
we go to left of P and right of PVaR, bothVaR and
expected profit decrease. These are the inefficient pric-
ing intervals as there will always exist a price where
the expected profit can be increased and risk can be
decreased, and it lies in the interval ½P,PVaR. Here,
ENPðPÞ decreases, whereas VaRðPÞ increases, thus
giving the interval of the tradeoff between risk and
returns, that is, we cannot be better off with respect to
both objectives. This interval is what we define as an
efficient pricing interval. Figure 3 demonstrates this
tradeoff of risk and return using the efficient pric-
ing interval.
5. Risk-adjusted pricing decisions
In Theorem 1, we maximised the expected returns of
the hospital; and in Theorem 3, we minimised the risk
given by VaRa of the hospital. In this section, we use
the concept of portfolio optimisation to make risk-
adjusted pricing decisions. We have developed thereby
two constrained optimisation models to analyse the
tradeoff between these conflicting objectives.
5.1. Pricing for return maximising hospital with
risk constraint
The hospital wants to maximise the expected returns
for a bound on VaR, which can be formulated as
the following constrained optimisation problem:
Max
P
E½NPðPÞ , subject to : VaRa  p
() ðPb0eb1lþb1rU
1ð1aÞÞðabPÞ
 p

From Corollary 2ðaÞ

Theorem 5: The optimal solution of the problem is
P ¼ aþ b0e
b1lþ
b1
2r2
2
 
b
2b , if it satisfies the constraint.
Else, the optimal price is given as
P ¼ ðaþkbÞ6
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ðakbÞ24bp
p
2b , where k ¼ b0eb1lþb1rU
1ð1aÞ.
Proof: The solution to the unconstrained problem is
given by Theorem 1. If this solution satisfies the con-
straint, then it is the optimal solution for the above
constrained optimisation as well. Else, we can solve
the constrained optimisation problem for the optimal
price. The Lagrangian for the constrained optimisa-
tion problem is
L ¼ P  b0eb1lþ
b1
2r2
2
 
ðabPÞ
þ kððPb0eb1lþb1rU
1ð1aÞÞðabPÞpÞ
@L
@P
¼ 0) a2bP þ b0eb1lþ
b1
2r2
2
 
b
þ k a2bP þ b0eb1lþb1rU
1ð1aÞb
h i
¼ 0
kððPb0eb1lþb1rU
1ð1aÞÞðabPÞpÞ
¼ 0 ðComplementary slackness conditionÞ
ðPb0eb1lþb1rU
1ð1aÞÞðabPÞ  p
k  0
	
ðFeasibility ConditionsÞ
Figure 3. Efficient pricing interval.
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If k ¼ 0, then the unconstrained optimal P is the
optimal solution, if its feasibility condition (con-
straint) is satisfied. If k> 0, then the constraint is
tight, i.e., P is the solution of the following quad-
ratic equation:
ðPb0eb1lþb1rU
1ð1aÞÞðabPÞ ¼ p
() bP2ðaþ bb0eb1lþb1rU
1ð1aÞÞP
þ ab0eb1lþb1rU
1ð1aÞ þ p ¼ 0
The roots of the above equation are given by:
P ¼
ðaþ kbÞ6
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ðaþ kbÞ24bðakþ pÞ
q
2b
,
k ¼ b0eb1lþb1rU
1ð1aÞ,
() P ¼ ðaþkbÞ6
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ðakbÞ24bp
p
2b , given
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ðakbÞ24bp
q
 0 () ðab0eb1lþb1rU
1ð1aÞÞ2
4b  p (implying that the
bound on VaR is always less than its maximum
value). From these roots, choose the one which gives
a higher expected profit as both of them give the
same VaR.
5.2. Pricing for risk minimising hospital with
target returns
A profit making hospital generally has some target
to be achieved in terms of profit. They would like to
set a minimum profit keeping the risk under con-
trol. Similar to the concept of the efficient portfolio,
the objective is to minimise the risk (VaRa) for a
given threshold amount of expected profit. So, the
problem faced by the hospital can be formulated as:
Min
P
VaRðPÞ , subject to : E NPðPÞ½   R
Rewriting the problem as maximisation problem,
() Max
P
ðPb0eb1lþb1rU
1ð1aÞÞðabPÞ
n o
,
subject to : P  Aeb1lþb1
2r2
2
 
ðabPÞ  R
Theorem 6: The optimal solution of the constrained
problem is P ¼ aþb0eb1lþb1rU
1ð1aÞb
2b , if it satisfies the
constraint. Else, the optimal price is given as
ðaþkbÞ6
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ðakbÞ24bR
p
2b , where k ¼ b0eb1lþ
b1
2r2
2 .
Proof: Solution to the unconstrained problem is
obtained from equation (10) as aþbb0e
b1lþb1rU1ð1aÞ
2b . If
this solution satisfies the constraint, then it is the opti-
mal solution for the above constrained optimisation
too. Else, we can solve the unconstrained optimisation
problem for the optimal price. The Lagrangian for the
constrained optimisation problem is:
L ¼ ðPb0eb1lþb1rU
1ð1aÞÞðabPÞ
þ k P  b0eb1lþ
b1
2r2
2
  
ða bPÞ  R
 
@L
@P
¼ 0) a2bP þ ðb0eb1lþb1rU
1ð1aÞÞb
þ k a 2bP þ b0eb1lþ
b1
2r2
2 b
 
¼ 0
k P  b0eb1lþ
b1
2r2
2
 
ða bPÞ  R
 
¼ 0
ðComplementary slackness conditionÞ
P  b0eb1lþ
b1
2r2
2
 
ðabPÞ  R
k  0
)
ðFeasibility ConditionsÞ
If k ¼ 0, then the unconstrained optimal P is the
optimal solution if its feasibility condition (con-
straint) is satisfied. If k> 0, then the constraint is
tight, i.e., P is the solution of the following quad-
ratic equation:
P  b0eb1lþ
b1
2r2
2
 
ðabPÞR ¼ 0
() bP2 aþ bb0eb1lþ
b1
2r2
2
 
P þ ab0eb1lþ
b1
2r2
2 þ R ¼ 0
The roots of the above equation are given by:
P ¼
ðaþ kbÞ6
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ðaþ kbÞ24bðakþ RÞ
q
2b
,
k ¼ b0eb1lþ
b1
2r2
2
() P ¼ ðaþkbÞ6
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ðakbÞ24bR
p
2b , given
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ðakbÞ24bp
q
 0 () ab0e
b1lþ
b1
2r2
2
 2
4b  p (implying that the
Figure 4. Log cost vs. log length of stay.
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bound on expected profit is always less than its
maximum value). From these roots, choose the one
which gives lower VaR as both of them give the
same expected profit.
6. Numerical illustration of the models
In this section, we have illustrated various models
developed in the paper numerically.
6.1. Validating concave function for total cost
We validated the concavity of the cost function
using a data set collected from a multi-speciality
hospital in India. The data used was collected for
cardiac surgery patients. Figure 4 shows the concave
trend exhibited by total cost incurred by a patient/
consumer as a function of the length of hospitalisa-
tion. It is evident that as the length of stay increases,
the total cost increases, but at a decreasing rate. To
further validate our claim, we ran the power model
b0X
b1 on the data set and provided the regression
results with the dependent variable as log (total
cost) and independent variable as log (length of stay
in days). We have used the log transformations to
linearize the regression model (Table 1). Figure 4
shows the regression model fit.
In the following sections, we demonstrate the
insights from the theorems derived in this paper
and expected profit, VaR, P, PVaR, threshold profit
are in monetary terms.
6.2. Effect of cost parameters on expected
net profit
Figure 5 shows the graph of net profit for different
value of b1 for a¼ 1000, b¼ 0.02, b0 ¼ 10000, l ¼
2:37 and r ¼ 0:2. It is evident from Figure 5 that
cost elasticity of LoS has a concave relationship with
expected profit, i.e., profit decreases at an increasing
rate. Figure 6 shows the graph of net profit at differ-
ent value of b0 for a¼ 1000, b¼ 0.02, b1 ¼ 0:4, l ¼
2:37 and r ¼ 0:2, from which we can conclude that
factors other than LoS have a convex relationship
with expected profit, i.e., profit decreases at a
decreasing rate.
Comparison between log-normal and Erlang K
for optimal profit is shown in Table 2. The follow-
ing parameter values are used:
6.3. Effect of LOS parameters on expected net profit
Figure 7 shows the graph of net profit at a different
value of l and b1 for a¼ 1000, b¼ 0.02, b0 ¼
10, 000 and r ¼ 0:2, from which we can conclude
that Expected Profit decreases at an increasing rate
with respect to the mean, but the rate increases with
cost elasticity of LoS. Figure 8 shows the graph of
Net Profit at different value of r and b1 for
a¼ 1000, b¼ 0.02, b0 ¼ 10, 000 and l ¼ 1:5, from
which we can conclude that Expected Profit
decreases at increasing rate w.r.t standard deviation,
but the rate increases with cost elasticity of LoS.
(Similar graphs with changing b0 have no effect on
the slope, so they have been omitted.)
We thereby conclude that cost elasticity is the
most important variable as it accentuates the effect
of mean and variance of LoS, thus the hospital
should exert effort in order to keep a small value of
b1 in order to achieve greater profits.
6.4. Effect of price on the probability of
exceeding the threshold profit
Figure 9 demonstrates the results from Theorem 2
and its corollaries. It shows that the probability of
Table 1. Regression results for equation log Y ¼ logb0þ
b1 log x.
Estimate
Std.
error t Value
p
value
Multiple
R^2
Adjusted
R^2
(Intercept) 10.829 0.109 99.56 0.000 46.40 45.86
Log (LOS) 0.4633 0.0500 9.26 0.000
Figure 5. Expected net profit vs. b1.
Figure 6. Expected net profit vs. b0.
Mean LOS 10
Variance LOS 20
K (Erlang) 5
h (Erlang) 2
l (log normal) 2.21
r2 (log normal) 0.183
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exceeding threshold for a¼ 1000, b¼ 0.02,
b0 ¼ 10, 000, b1 ¼ 0:2, l ¼ 2:37 and r ¼ 0:2. We
observe that the probability of exceeding a threshold
has a concave relationship with Price and attains
maxima which gives the hospital the upper bound
on price if they have a fixed target. Also, this prob-
ability varies with the threshold assumed. Here, we
have taken three different thresholds (expected
profit, a value higher than the expected profit and a
value lower than the expected profit).
The above graph also demonstrates the inverse
relationship between the threshold and the probabil-
ity. As the threshold decreases, the probability
increases, which suggests that if the hospital desires
a higher confidence level, then it should set its tar-
get threshold profit low.
6.5. Lower bound on price with fixed
confidence level
Figure 10 plots threshold profit at different value of
price for a¼ 1000, b¼ 0.02, b0 ¼ 10, 000, b1 ¼ 0:2,
l ¼ 2:37, r ¼ 0:2 and confidence level ¼ 95%. It
shows that for a fixed confidence level, there is a
lower bound on a price beyond which the hospital
makes positive profits. Also, in this case, the hos-
pital would not accept a price less than Rupees
17,165. It also achieves maxima at VaR minimising
price as both of them are equivalent.
6.6. Comparison of return maximising and risk
minimising prices
Table 3 shows that the risk minimising price is
greater than the return maximising price. For the
values in Table 3, we plot the expected profit and
(–VaR) for different values of P given in Table 4
and is shown in Figure 11.
In Figure 11, we observe that the VaR plot always
lies beneath the expected profit plot. Also, the opti-
mal price lies between return maximising price and
risk minimising price. Outside this price range, we
observe from the table and its plot that the hospital
would be making a lesser profit with higher risk.
The tradeoff lies between these two values. From
Table 5, we can note that in the efficient price inter-
val {41,465 44,303}, the hospital can go for a higher
profit with higher risk or lower profit with lower
risk. Figure 3 plots the value in Table 5 and graph-
ically shows the tradeoff that occurs between the
profit maximising and risk minimising prices for
different prices.
So, we suggest that the hospital with demand
and cost parameters as given in Table 3 should
always price the treatment between Rupees 41,465
and 44,303. The exact price depends on the
risk averseness.
6.7. Efficient pricing interval with constraints
We know that the constraints/bounds onVaR and
expected profit are below their respective maxima.
We can observe from Figure 12 that the constraints
either shrink the efficient pricing interval or do not
affect it at all. In either case, the optimal price
remains within the boundaries of risk minimising
and profit maximising price. So, we conclude that
the price quoted should be between these bounds
depending on the desirability of the hospital for
higher profit, higher risk or lower profit, lower risk.
Table 2. Comparison between log-normal and Erlang optimal price.
a (max
demand)
b (price
sensitivity) b0 b1
Expected cost
(Erlang) P (for Erlang)
Expected cost
(log normal)
P (log
normal)
15,000 0.2 10,000 0.1 12504.02373 43752.01186 12484.65254 43742.33
15,000 0.2 10,000 0.2 15588.79393 45294.39696 15615.20459 45307.6
15,000 0.2 10,000 0.5 30841.64077 52920.82039 30890.85215 52945.43
15,000 0.2 10,000 0.6 38840.23702 56920.11851 38920.65525 56960.33
Figure 7. Expected net profit vs. l.
Figure 8. Expected net profit vs. r.
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7. Conclusion and implications
In this paper, we analysed an emerging pricing prac-
tice across healthcare service providers. We dis-
cussed flat rate pricing using models which
incorporate the uncertainty arising from severity
and length of stay. We find the optimal price for a
risk-neutral hospital maximising its returns/expected
profit and a risk-averse hospital minimising its VaR
with, i.e., VaRa. We analysed the risk defined as the
probability of not obtaining target profit associated
with a given price and compared it for different
thresholds. We showed that a hospital could vary its
target profit around the maximum expected profit
for different value risks. We also suggested an upper
bound on price which will minimise the risk and a
lower bound on price which gives positive profits
with a fixed probability. After studying profit and
VaR separately, we have developed two models
which take both into account and help in making
risk-adjusted pricing decisions. We found out that
the optimal price would always lie between the risk
minimising and profit maximising prices.
The primary contribution of this paper is that we
discuss the tradeoff of risk and returns in a health-
care setting. The results presented in the paper pro-
vide different bounds on price, which is a useful
guide for hospital managers when faced with the
problem of the price for treatment under cost
uncertainty. The models developed in the paper will
help healthcare service providers in price negotia-
tions with insurance companies, organisations’
health benefits for their employees and government.
Figure 9. Probability of exceeding threshold vs. price.
Figure 10. Threshold profit vs. price.
Table 3. Values used for calculations in Table 4.
a B m r b0 b1
1000 0.2 2.37 0.2 10,000 0.5
Table 4. Expected profit and value-at-risk at price P.
P Expected net profit VaR
Lower bound
38,607 1,293,190 0
40,000 1,413,674 278,600
41,000 1,452,307 430,740
Profit maximizing P
41,465 1,456,646 487,953
42,000 1,450,939 542,880
42,800 1,421,045 603,792
43,500 1,373,888 636,090
Risk minimizing PVaR
44,303 1,295,597 649,002
45,000 1,206,837 639,300
46,000 1,045,470 591,440
Max. Price
50,000 0 0
Figure 11. Expected profit and VaR vs. price.
Table 5. Tradeoff between the bounds.
Price Net profit VaR
41,000 1,452,307 430,740
41,465 1,456,646 487,953
42,000 1,450,939 542,880
42,800 1,421,045 603,792
44,303 1,295,597 649,002
45,000 1,206,837 639,300
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7.1. Importance of work and implications
Several countries are now encouraging price transpar-
ency by reporting healthcare prices to the public. In
the US, more than 30 states are now reporting prices
of different hospitals to the consumers (Sinaiko &
Rosenthal, 2011). One of the earliest examples of the
fixed price model being reported in the US has been
in the state of New Hampshire, which launched the
HealthCost website to report a fixed pricing structure
of about thirty common healthcare services (Tu &
Lauer, 2009). From the governmental perspective too,
the US government is taking steps to provide complete
price information to the patients. For example, the
Centre for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) in
the US has made available the hospital-specific charges
for more than 3,000US hospitals through their website
(CMS.gov, 2019). They pay the hospitals flat fees per
case; these Medicare hospital payments contribute to
about 31% of the hospitals’ net revenues (Reinhardt,
2006). In the UK, the NHS Foundation Trusts and pri-
vate healthcare providers such as BMI Healthcare,
TRUSTPLUS, Nova Healthcare and Spire Healthcare
provide fixed price packages for treatments.
The fixed price model is also helping the govern-
ment to keep healthcare costs under control, but on
the flip side, from the healthcare service provider’s
perspective, it might not be the ideal pricing strategy.
Despite this, there are many hospitals which are look-
ing to offer fixed prices for common medical treat-
ments due to increased competition (Richman et al.,
2008). Taking the example of India, with the increase
in competition among the private healthcare pro-
viders, the hospitals are advertising treatment proce-
dures and are stating the price upfront to the
consumers. This increasing transparency in pricing
has been beneficial to the consumers as it keeps the
prices in control with an assurance of high service
quality. Government policies are also forcing the
healthcare service providers to quote a flat rate for
treatments. Several state governments in India sign
flat-rate contracts (or policies like Rashtriya Swasthya
Bima Yojna) with hospitals for providing healthcare
services to the underprivileged section of the society.
Adoption of flat-rate pricing is not just due to
the growing pressure by policymakers for price
transparency and increased competition; it also ben-
efits the healthcare service providers, especially in
view of “healthcare tourism,” wherein the fixed pric-
ing model becomes an integral component to draw
consumers/customers not only from one’s state but
also neighbouring states. Package prices are quite
common in the international healthcare market
place (Herrick, 2007). According to the report
“Medical Value Travel in India” published by
KPMG and FICCI, the healthcare tourism market
has been estimated to grow at an annual rate of
15% to reach about USD 158.2 billion by 2017. The
boom in healthcare tourism has led to the emer-
gence of companies that act as providers of medical
tourism. These companies link patients to hospitals
in different countries and provide fixed healthcare
packages which include the cost of surgery, hospital-
isation as well as travel logistics, visa, and transpor-
tation and charge a fixed price (Hall, 2013). The
leading medical tourism companies include Med
Retreat – a US-based medical tourism agency,
Planet Hospital – a medical tourism portal in US,
Indiaheals, and Advatech; the latter two entities are
both India-based companies. Healthcare tourism is
also popular in many South Asian countries such as
Thailand, Bangkok, Malaysia and Singapore. A core
element of healthcare tourism is that hospitals provide
transparent pricing for a wide range of common sur-
gical procedures with their fixed price packages.
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